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The Decision to Repurchase Debt
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4. Although researchers have examined share repurchases and dividend payouts in 
great detail, debt repurchases have received little attention. This is surprising because 
they are quite common and they tend to involve large amounts of cash.
5. Specialized studies include Tony R. Wingler and Donald Jud, “Premium Debt Ten-
ders: Analysis and Evidence,” Financial Management 19 (1990), which considers a 
sample of debt buybacks by utility companies in the mid 1980s; Marcel Kahan and 
Bruce Tuckman, “Do Bondholders Lose From Junk Bond Covenant Changes?,” Journal of 
Business 66 (1993), which examines consent solicitations, and uses a subsample of 24 
debt tender offers; Sris Chatterjee, Upinder Dhillon and Gabriel Ramirez, “Coercive Ten-
der and Exchange Offers in Distressed High-Yield Debt Restructurings: An Empirical 
Analysis,” Journal of Financial Economics 38, 333 – 360, 1995, who examine dis-
tressed high-yield restructurings, with a sub-sample of 16 tender offers; Steven Mann, 
and Eric Powers, “Determinants of Bond Tender Offer Premiums and the Percentage 
Tendered,” Journal of Banking & Finance 31, 547 – 566, 2007, who examine the time 
period 1997 – 2003 and focus entirely on bondholders; Abe de Jong, Peter Roosenboom 
and Willem Schramade, “Who Benefits from Bond Tender Offers in Europe?” Journal of 
Multinational Financial Management 10 (2009), which studies tender offers by Euro-
pean firms seeking to reduce debt, refinance or undergo a change in ownership structure; 
and Mark Schaub, “Short-term Wealth Effects from Debt Buyback Announcements,” 
Applied Economics Letters 17, 1351 – 1354, 2010, who examines the short-term 
shareholder wealth effects of debt buyback announcements for a small sample of firms. 
B
by Timothy Kruse, Xavier University; Tom Nohel and Steven K. Todd,  
Loyola University Chicago
F
rom the perspective of shareholders, debt financ-
ing has costs and benefits. On the positive side, 
debt financing is cheaper than equity financing, 
first because bondholders demand lower returns 
than shareholders and second because of the tax shields 
created by debt interest payments. Those financial savings 
generally flow through to shareholders. But debt may also 
have a positive “control” effect on managerial behavior, in the 
sense that the fixed obligations of debt financing can discour-
age managers from pursuing value-destroying investments 
(such as diversifying acquisitions).1 
On the other hand, too much debt can raise the poten-
tial costs of financial distress by increasing the likelihood of 
bankruptcy.
In 1977, MIT’s Stewart Myers proposed a model of 
optimal corporate capital structure that saw corporate manag-
ers making a trade-off between the tax benefits of debt and 
the costs of financial distress.2 Myers also pointed out that 
excessive leverage may create a costly conflict between a firm’s 
debt-holders and its shareholders.3 Concern about meeting 
the company’s debt service could cause managers to pass up 
positive net present value projects, and so reduce the value of 
the firm. And it’s not just the interest and principal payments 
associated with debt obligations that can lead to corporate 
underinvestment. To protect bondholders against the possi-
bility of wealth transfers to shareholders, bond indentures 
usually include contractual restrictions called “covenants” 
that limit (or prohibit) payouts, asset sales, acquisitions and 
leverage ratios. For this reason, companies often repurchase 
debt to circumvent restrictive covenants so they can pursue 
promising investment opportunities. 
But if too much debt can create costly conflicts between 
debtholders and shareholders, it is very difficult to measure 
such “agency costs” of debt. One way to estimate such costs is 
to examine the terms of the tender offers that are sometimes 
used to buy back large amounts of debt. The costs incurred 
in buying back debt (which include legal and advisory fees, in 
addition to any premium paid to debt-holders) can be viewed 
as providing a “lower bound” estimate on the agency costs 
of debt. In this sense debt repurchases present a near perfect 
laboratory to study the agency costs of debt.4
To date, there has been no comprehensive study of debt 
repurchases.5 Our study attempts to fill that gap and shed 
some light on why companies make tender offers for their 
debt, enhance our understanding of the agency costs of debt, 
and see whether tender offers create value for shareholders. As 
in the case of share repurchases, companies may repurchase 
debt either by buying bonds on the open market or through 
a tender offer. We focused on tender offers because they are 
likely to be more distinct, as well as larger in magnitude. 
Many financial economists have examined how stock 
prices are affected by changes in leverage connected with 
equity issues and repurchases. Very generally, they find 
that shareholders benefit from increases in leverage and lose 
from decreases. There are many exceptions, however, and 
the particular circumstances of tender offers are likely to be 
important.
As we report later, our study found that announcements 
of debt tender offers have been viewed favorably by the stock 
market, with cumulative announcement-period returns to 
shareholders of 1.47%. Moreover, although tender offers 
financed with equity have generally failed to add value, debt 
buybacks that have been financed with asset sales have been 
accompanied by average cumulative announcement returns 
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6. We search the Wall Street Journal Index and the Dow Jones Newswire service (via 
Factiva) for firms that engage in debt tender offers during our sample period. We treat 
tender offers for multiple debt issues as one event. Our initial sample includes 270 debt 
repurchase tender offers. We eliminate exchange offers and debt tender offers with con-
founding events. We also eliminate private firms and firms for which there is no Compu-
stat or CRSP data. 
of 3.77%. Efforts to eliminate payout, refunding or asset 
sale covenants are also associated with higher announcement 
returns. The market also responds differently to tender offers 
financed with primary and secondary equity issues. Returns 
have been lower for those tenders involving secondary sales 
of equity. 
When compared to a matched sample of non-tendering 
firms, companies that tender for debt tend to be larger (in 
terms of total assests), and have less cash and higher lever-
age. Prior to the tender offers, the companies that buy back 
their debt have lower operating returns than their peers—and 
their shares trade at a discount to their peers. After the tender 
offers, assets increase, operating returns improve, and the 
tendering companies’ shares trade at a market premium to 
their peers.
Although many companies cite debt reduction as one of 
their main motives for tendering for their debt, we find that 
the average firm does not actually reduce debt very much after 
the tender. But companies with tax loss carry-forwards are an 
exception, however, in that they do reduce leverage. This is 
consistent with the Myers’ tradeoff theory of capital structure. 
Moreover, tendering companies may be more motivated to 
remove covenants than to reduce their level of debt.
Data and Findings
We compiled a sample of 208 debt tender offers undertaken 
by 189 different companies over the period 1988-1996.6 This 
period spans a full cycle of interest rates, includes both a reces-
sion (1990 – 1991) and an expansion (mid 1990s) and also 
a period of tight monetary policy (1994), when the Federal 
Reserve was trying to reign in an overheating economy. 
Table 1 shows the types (Panel A) and stated reasons 
(Panel B) for the 208 tender offers we studied. Panel C 
indicates whether the tender included consent solicitations 
that changed covenant terms, and Panel D lists the source of 
funds for the tender offer (i.e. asset sales, cash, new equity).
More than 70% of the tender offers were fixed-price 
Table 1  Sample Description Table 2  Details of the debt tender offers 
Descriptive statistics of 208 debt tender offer events executed  
by 189 companies during the period 1989 – 1996.
Panel A – Type of Offer
N % of sample
Fixed Price 149 71.6
Fixed Spread 39 18.8
Dutch Auction 8 3.8
No Information 12 5.8
Panel B – Reason for Tender
N % of sample
Avoid default 7 3.4
Restructure Debt/Distress 19 9.1
Extend Maturity 3 1.4
Reduce Debt 53 25.5
Reduce Interest Expense 51 24.5
Refinancing/Refunding 18 8.7
Financial Flexibility 16 7.7
Covenants 41 19.7
Required 5 2.4
Merger related – tendering firm is:
Target 24 11.6
Acquirer 19 9.2
Not Given 25 12.0
Panel C – Consent Solicitations                   
N % of sample
Number with Consent Solicitations 128 61.5
Covenant to be Relaxed N    % of consents
Refund 18 14.1
New Debt Issue 2 1.6
Priority Easement 1 0.8
Investment 3 2.3
Distress 3 2.3
Asset Sale 6 4.7
Merger 5 3.9
Repurchase 4 3.1
Dividend 2 1.6
Various/All 15 11.7
Not Given 69 56.3
Panel D – Source of Funds
N        % of sample
Cash 41 19.7
Debt 83 39.9
Bank/Credit Line 29 13.9
Exchange Offer 7 3.4
Common Equity 29 13.9
Preferred Equity 9 4.3
Initial Public Offering 17 8.2
Asset Sale 31 14.9
Not Given 48 23.1
Value and relative value of the 208 debt tender offer events executed  
by 189 companies during the period 1989 – 1996.
$-Value of Offers Mean Median
Amount outstanding ($ millions) 287.0 115.0
Portion of issue sought (%) 89.9 100.0
Portion of issue received (%) 85.3 95.4
Relative Value of Offers Mean Median
As a percentage of Assets in year -1 26.6% 17.9%
As a percentage of Debt in year -1 80.2% 40.5%
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7. See Eugene Fama and Kenneth French: “Industry Costs of Equity,” Journal of Fi-
nancial Economics 43, 153 – 193 (1997).
8. This all boils down to the relative market power of creditors and debtors, which 
varies throughout the credit cycle.
Table 4 examines the industry break-down of the 208 
debt tender offers, based on the Fama and French indus-
try classifications.7 No single industry dominates the table. 
The industries with the largest concentrations of debt tender 
activity were (1) retail, (2) healthcare, and (3) utilities, which 
represented 9.4%, 7.8%, and 7.8% of our sample, respectively. 
Possible Effects of Debt Tenders on Firm Value
One might reasonably expect the market’s reaction to debt 
tender offers to be negative if one assumes that it is a leverage-
decreasing event. But if the tender offer involves cash rather 
than exchanges of newly issued shares for outstanding debt, 
the tender offer may not reduce net debt. In fact it might even 
increase it. As a result, the share price reaction may depend 
on several factors, including the costs and benefits of cove-
nants, the firm’s capital structure, the source of financing, and 
tax effects. The source of funds for a debt tender offer might 
be cash on hand, newly borrowed cash (bank loans or public 
debt), equity, or the proceeds from an asset sale. The reaction 
to a debt buyback likely depends on which of these sources 
provided the financing for the transaction.
There are a number of ways that a debt tender could 
benefit shareholders:
1. If the company repurchases debt with covenants, it 
may eliminate restrictions that prevent it from pursuing 
value-enhancing activities. 
2. The company may save on restructuring/bankruptcy 
costs. Companies that are financially distressed may be able to 
repurchase their debt at a discount (which is likely to involve 
a transfer of wealth from bondholders to shareholders). 8
3. The company may benefit from the tax-deductibility of 
interest payments, if indeed net debt increases and the firm’s 
marginal corporate tax rate is high.
offers. The two most commonly cited reasons for the tender 
offer were to reduce debt (25.5% of the sample) and to reduce 
interest expense (24.5%). Covenant relaxation was cited as 
the reason for the tender offer in 19.7% of our events. Only 
seven issuers (3.4%) stated that they were tendering for debt 
to avoid default. Moreover, just over 60% of the tender offers 
coincided with consent solicitations. Most of the time, issuers 
do not state which covenant they are seeking to relax; but 
when a specific covenant was cited, it was most likely to be a 
refunding covenant (14.1% of all consent solicitations). Nearly 
40% of all debt tender offers involved issuing new public 
debt to fund the tender. Other sources of funding included 
cash (in 19.7% of the cases), asset sales (14.9%), bank debt 
(13.9%) and common equity (13.9%). In 17 (or 8.2%) of the 
debt tender offers, the company was going public and using 
the proceeds from the IPO to pay for the debt tender offer.
Table 2 provides detailed information on the tender 
offers. In the average case, the company was seeking to 
retire 90% of a $287.0 million outstanding debt issue that 
represented about a quarter (26.6%) of the firm’s total assets 
and 80% of its debt (the median figures are all lower). These 
percentages are quite large compared to those in tender offers 
for stock, which usually target between 15% and 20% of all 
outstanding shares.
As can be seen in Table 3, which summarizes debt tender 
offers by year, there were offers in every year from 1988-1996, 
with 1996 having the most (28.4% of the sample). Over the 
entire period, 10-year Treasury note yields varied from a 
low of 5.96% in 1993 to a high of 8.48% in 1990. Spreads 
between AAA corporate issues and Treasuries ranged from 
a low of 73 basis points in 1991 to 137 basis points in 1993. 
Spreads between BAA and AAA corporate issues ranged from 
a low of 74 basis points in 1993 to 96 basis points in 1990.
Table 3  Annual break-down of debt tender offers 
Yields, spreads and annual break-down of the 208 debt tender offer events executed by 189 companies  
during the period 1989 – 1996.
Yields (%) on: Spreads (%)
10 Year AAA BAA AAA less BAA
Year # % Treasuries Corporate Corporate 10 Year less AAA
1989 14 6.7 8.28 9.10 10.03 0.82 0.93
1990 18 8.7 8.48 9.26 10.22 0.78 0.96
1991 26 12.5 8.28 9.01 9.96 0.73 0.95
1992 27 13.0 7.26 8.22 9.05 0.96 0.83
1993 21 10.1 5.96 7.33 8.07 1.37 0.74
1994 14 6.7 7.10 7.97 8.65 0.87 0.68
1995 29 13.9 6.17 7.30 7.90 1.13 0.60
1996 59 28.4 6.91 7.71 8.40 0.80 0.69
Total 208 100.0
88 Journal of Applied Corporate Finance • Volume 26 Number 2  Spring 2014
How can this be explained? The results in Tables 5 and 
6 offer some clues.
Compared to the control matches, companies that 
tendered for debt had lower average and median current 
ratios and cash-to-total asset ratios before the tenders. (The 
differences were statistically significant in the years before and 
after the tender event, as well as the year of the tender event.) 
Tendering firms also had higher long-term debt ratios. All 
of this is consistent with an intent move toward an optimal 
capital structure by reducing leverage. 
The interest coverage ratios for tendering companies were 
significantly lower than the coverage ratios for the control 
sample. After the debt tenders, coverage ratios increased, with 
the median interest coverage ratio for tendering firms rising 
from 2.66 in the year prior to the tender event to 3.50 in 
the year after the tender event. These ratios are consistent 
with a debt rating of BB, slightly below investment grade. 
Table 5 also indicates that, compared to the control sample, 
debt-tendering firms had lower operating returns and lower 
market-to-book ratios prior to the tender event. 
In summary, Tables 5 and 6 indicate that, compared to 
the control sample, companies that tender for debt have more 
assets but also higher leverage ratios. Debt-tendering firms 
have less cash and are more financially constrained. Prior to 
the tender event, debt-tendering firms have lower operating 
returns than their peers; they also trade at a discount. After 
the tender offer, assets increase, operating returns improve 
and the tendering firms are awarded a slight market premium.
The Market Response to Debt Tenders
We next examined the three-day equity cumulative announce-
ment returns (CARs) for companies that tendered for their 
debt. As reported in Table 7, the average CAR was 1.47%, 
and the median CAR was 0.58%. (Both values are statisti-
cally significant.)
 But, as we noted earlier, the source of the funds used to 
repurchase the debt played an important role in the market’s 
response. 
When equity or a mix of debt and equity were used to 
finance the debt buyback, the CARs were statistically indis-
tinguishable from zero. When debt was used, but no equity, 
the mean CAR was 0.95% (and marginally significant). When 
neither debt nor equity was used, the mean CAR was 2.46% 
and the median was 1.02% (both statistically significant). 
Moreover, in the case of those tenders that did not involve 
new debt or equity (but only either cash on hand or asset 
sales), the largest returns occurred when companies sold assets 
to finance the debt tenders. There were 19 of these events, and 
the average CAR in such cases was 3.77%, while the median 
was 1.99% (both statistically significant). By contrast, when 
cash on hand was used, the CARs were statistically no differ-
ent from zero.
Using a cross-sectional multivariate analysis of the 
Both debt and equity have costs and benefits that need 
to be balanced against each other. If a company has drifted 
towards a capital structure with too much debt, a tender offer 
for debt will move the firm closer to its optimal capital struc-
ture. In this case, the reaction to a debt buyback should be 
most positive (or least negative) for companies that are the 
most over-levered.
Although most companies claimed that they wished to 
reduce debt (Panel B of Table 1), we find that most were not 
significantly less levered after the tender offer. 
Table 4  Industry break-down of debt tender offers 
Industry break-down of the 208 debt tender offer events executed  
by 189 companies during the period 1989 – 1996, based on Fama and French 
(1997) industry classifications.
Industry # %
Retail 18 9.4
Healthcare 15 7.8
Utilities 15 7.8
Business Services 13 6.8
Telecommunications 12 6.3
Business Supplies 10 5.2
Petroleum and Natural Gas 10 5.2
Steel Works, Etc. 9 4.7
Transportation 9 4.7
Chemicals 7 3.7
Restaurants, Hotel, Motel 7 3.7
Banking 6 3.1
Consumer Goods 6 3.1
Machinery 6 3.1
Construction Materials 4 2.1
Personal Services 4 2.1
Rubber and Plastic Products 4 2.1
Wholesale 4 2.1
Alcoholic Beverages 3 1.6
Entertainment 3 1.6
Food Products 3 1.6
Miscellaneous 3 1.6
Printing and Publishing 3 1.6
Real Estate 3 1.6
Automobiles and Trucks 2 1.0
Electronic Equipment 2 1.0
Medical Equipment 2 1.0
Trading 2 1.0
Aircraft 1 0.5
Computers 1 0.5
Measuring/Control Equip. 1 0.5
Precious Metals 1 0.5
Recreational Products 1 0.5
Shipping Containers 1 0.5
Textiles 1
Total 192* 100.0
* Note: for 16 observations, no SIC code was available
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9. Here we introduce a number of dummy variables to describe the sources of financ-
ing for the debt tender offers. EQUITY takes on a value of 1 when the financing source is 
secondary equity; otherwise it has a value of 0. IPO, ASALE, CASH, BANK, DEBT, PREF 
and NOSOURCE are similarly defined for the following financing sources: primary equity, 
asset sales, cash, bank loans, public debt, preferred equity and unknown. We use a dif-
ferent set of dummy variables to describe the covenants that are being relaxed. ALLCOV 
takes on a value of 1 when all the covenants are being removed; otherwise it has a value 
of 0. PAYCOV, REFCOV, ASALECOV, MERGECOV and NOCOV are similarly defined for 
the following covenants: payout, refunding, asset sales, merger, and no specific cove-
nants mentioned. Note that NOCOV includes all cases of consent solicitation where there 
is no mention of specific covenants to be removed.
10. The NOCOV variable is positive and significant at the 1% level in all specifica-
tions, indicating that an attempt to remove covenants is viewed favorably, even if there 
is no indication of a specific covenant(s) to be removed. 
11. In these regressions, the dependent variable is the change in (book-value) lever-
age between Year -1 and Year +1. The independent variables include three dummy 
variables: MERGER, TAXLOSS and IPO. MERGER takes on the value 1 when the debt-
tendering firm is involved in a takeover/merger; otherwise MERGER has a value of 0. 
TAXLOSS takes on the value of 1 when the debt-tendering firm has tax-loss carry-for-
wards in either year +1 or +2; otherwise TAXLOSS has a value of 0. IPO takes on the 
value of 1 when the debt-tendering firm is going public; otherwise IPO has a value of 0. 
Finally, the findings reported in Table 9 indicate that 
changes in leverage are positively related to a merger event and 
negatively related to an IPO event or tax loss carry-forward 
opportunities.11 These observed leverage changes are consis-
tent with the static tradeoff theory of capital structure.
Three Examples
We now describe three specific cases that illustrate situations 
that we view as “typical” of our sample firms. These include 
Healthtrust’s tender offer for three series of notes in 1991, 
announcement returns, we found (as reported in Table 8)9 
that debt tenders that were financed with secondary equity 
issues were associated with negative market reactions, while 
those funded with the proceeds from IPOs received a positive 
market response. One possible explanation of the first of 
these two findings is that the market treats debt tender offers 
financed by secondary equity sales as back-door exchange 
offers that reduce leverage. We also found that the removal of 
payment, refunding, and asset sale covenants have a positive 
effect on announcement returns.10 
Table 5  Financial information of debt tendering firms 
Based on 192 firms for which financial information is available.  The test statistics report results for tests of the adjusted figures being different  
from zero; *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.
Entry format
All sample firms with Compustat data
Sample firms with control matches (unadjusted data)
Adjusted figures: Entry = sample firm – control firm
Year -1 Year 0 Year 1
Mean Median n Mean Median n Mean Median n
Total assets (actuals) (actuals) 4313.8 965.4 174 4332.6 1238.1 167 4411.8 1320.5 159
3706.2 1116.73 139 4207.9 1300.6 133 4179.4 1441.0 125
1275.8 511.3*** 1477.5 571.9*** 1099.9 598.4***
Current ratio 1.75 1.44 158 1.68 1.37 150 1.61 1.43 143
1.72 1.42 129 1.63 1.36 122 1.58 1.42 114
-0.99*** -0.17*** -1.12*** -0.37*** -1.01*** -0.29***
Cash to total assets 0.07 0.03 173 0.07 0.03 166 0.06 0.02 159
0.07 0.03 139 0.07 0.03 133 0.06 0.02 125
-0.04*** -0.001** -0.04*** -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.01***
Long-term debt ratio 0.41 0.36 175 0.42 0.37 167 0.41 0.35 159
0.40 0.35 139 0.40 0.34 133 0.40 0.34 125
0.19*** 0.15*** 0.17*** 0.11*** 0.16*** 0.12***
Market-to-book 1.39 1.19 135 1.53 1.26 145 1.60 1.25 144
1.40 1.20 128 1.46 1.24 126 1.57 1.24 122
-0.31** -0.01 -0.20 0.04 -0.12 0.04
Operating return 0.122 0.130 168 0.127 0.124 163 0.132 0.127 157
0.120 0.128 139 0.124 0.123 133 0.133 0.127 125
-0.008 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 0.000
Interest coverage n.a. 2.47 168 n.a. 2.74 163 n.a.. 3.15 156
n.a. 2.66 139 n.a. 3.07 125 n.a. 3.50 124
n.a. -1.22*** n.a. -1.88*** n.a. -1.13***
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Table 6   Changes in Financial Variables from year -1 to year 1 
Based on approximately 135 firms for which financial information is available and control firms have been identified. The test statistics report results for  
tests of equality of means and medians, respectively.  The test statistics report results for tests of the adjusted figures being different from zero; *, **, and *** 
indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
Entry format
Sample firms with control matches (unadjusted data)
Adjusted figures: Entry = sample firm – control firm
n Mean First Quartile Median Third Quartile
Total assets (actuals) 125 608.3 -26.1 134.5*** 648.0
166.0*** -247.5 -2.3 507.7
Current ratio 114 -0.14 -0.50 -0.07 0.22
-0.11 -0.62 -0.112 0.44
Cash to total assets 125 -0.01 -0.03 -0.003** 0.01
-0.02 -0.07 -0.005 0.03
Long-term debt ratio 125 -0.001 -0.07 -0.02 0.05
-0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0.08
Market-to-book 115 0.14 -0.07 0.04 0.21
0.18 -0.11 0.05** 0.41
Operating return 125 0.009 -0.024 -0.001 0.024
0.014* -0.035 0.002 0.036
Interest coverage 124 n.a. -0.83 0.24 1.56
n.a. -2.38 0.40 4.70
Equity issues can be common, preferred, or IPO.  Some firms doing debt or equity issue also might have an asset sale.  
 *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively; p-values are in parentheses.
n mean (%) median (%)
Complete sample 160 1.47*** 0.58***
(<0.01) (<0.01)
Financing the offer
Debt issue or bank loan, but no equity 64 0.95* 0.50
(0.10) (0.16)
Equity issue, but no debt 9 -2.71 -0.38
(0.25) (0.20)
Both debt/bank and equity 15 1.41 1.32
(0.44) (0.42)
Neither debt/bank nor equity 72 2.46*** 1.02***
(<0.01) (<0.01)
Among neither debt/bank nor equity
Cash on hand 14 1.25 1.38
(0.15) (0.15)
Asset sale 19 3.77*** 1.99**
(0.01) (0.03)
No source given 41 2.13** 0.64**
(0.03) (0.04)
Table 7   Three day announcement effects (CARs) 
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(replacing public debt); an IPO expected to bring in around 
$600 million in proceeds; and a tender offer to purchase three 
issues of outstanding high yield debt together with a consent 
solicitation seeking bondholder approval to remove any and 
all covenants from the indenture. The public debt issues 
included 11.75% ESOP senior notes, 15.25% subordinated 
senior notes, and zero coupon senior subordinated notes. 
Healthtrust’s original offer for the coupon bonds was 105% of 
Western Union’s tender offer for two series of notes begun in 
late 1990, and Scott Paper’s tender offer for several series of 
notes in late 1994.
Healthtrust, Inc.: In the fall of 1991, Healthtrust, Inc., 
a company spun off from HCA in 1987, decided to restruc-
ture its balance sheet. At the time, Healthtrust had $685 
million of high-yield debt outstanding. The restructuring 
would involve several components: additional bank debt 
3-day announcement return (-1, +1) is the dependent variable.  EQUITY takes on the value of 1 when a secondary common equity offering is a source 
of funds and 0 otherwise.  IPO, ASALE, CASH, BANK, DEBT, PREF, and NOSOURCE are similarly defined when the source of funds is an IPO, an 
asset sale, cash, a bank loan, public debt preferred shares, and not given, respectively. ALLCOV takes on the value of 1 when the firm is attempting 
to remove all/multiple covenants and 0 otherwise.  PAYCOV, REFCOV, ASALECOV, MERGECOV and NO COV are similarly defined when the firm is 
attempting to remove a payout, refunding, asset sale, or merger covenant, or when no information is available, respectively.  LOGASSET is equal to the 
Log(Assets) in book value terms. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively.   
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Variable
Intercept 0.0705*** 0.0045 0.0301
(3.25) (0.15) (1.29)
EQUITY -0.0477*** -0.0359**
(-3.01) (-2.30)
IPO 0.0707** 0.0581**
(2.41) (2.04)
ASALE 0.0182 0.0127
(1.35) (1.01)
CASH -0.0113 -0.0101
(-0.90) (-0.87)
BANK 0.0065 0.0051
(0.44) (0.36)
DEBT -0.0040
(-0.35)
PREF -0.0032 -0.0167
(-1.11) (-0.82)
NOSOURCE 0.0056
(0.40)
ALLCOV 0.0087
(0.29)
PAYCOV 0.0686*** 0.0480*
(1.98) (1.64)
REFCOV 0.0619** .0410**
(2.31) (2.15)
ASALECOV 0.1104*** 0.0791***
(3.52) (3.08)
MERGECOV 0.0283
(0.82)
NOCOV 0.0596** 0.0390***
(2.52) (2.68)
LOGASSET -0.0074*** -0.0065** -0.0070**
(-2.79) (-2.46) (-2.59)
Adjusted R2 0.0958 0.1255 0.1536
F-value 2.66*** 3.89*** 3.33***
N 141 141 141
Table 8  Cross-Sectional Multivariate Analysis of Announcement Returns 
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Scott Paper: Scott Paper’s restructuring efforts in 1994 
involved two tender offers. In January, in an effort to “reduce 
interest costs,” the company paid $118 per $100 face value to 
repurchase $72.1 million notional of 11.5% notes that would 
have been callable two years later at a price of $105. The tender 
offer was financed by a new offering of commercial paper. In 
April, Scott Paper hired Albert Dunlap, a turnaround special-
ist who initiated a series of job cuts (amounting to more than 
1/3 of the company’s workforce) and asset sales worth more 
than $2 billion. In December, Scott Paper repurchased $910 
million notional of 8.8% and 7% bonds maturing in 2022 
and 2023 respectively. During Dunlap’s 18 month tenure as 
CEO, Scott Paper’s stock nearly tripled in price. In July 1995, 
Scott Paper merged with Kimberly-Clark. 
Conclusion
The decision to repurchase debt must follow from a firm’s 
capital structure policy. Both debt and equity have costs 
and benefits that need to be balanced against each other. 
Before even considering a debt tender offer, though, 
management must have some sense of the firm’s optimal 
capital structure. 
If a company’s debt seems excessive in relation to its equity 
(i.e. because the risk of financial distress seems great), its debt 
may be trading at a discount. In that case, a debt tender offer 
should directly increase shareholder wealth. If the debt repur-
chased had restrictive covenants that were preventing the firm 
from pursuing NPV investments and other opportunities to 
add value, the tender could also have increased firm value by 
increasing the firm’s financial flexibility.
The share price reaction to debt tender offers depends 
upon many particular factors, including the costs of binding 
protective covenants and financial distress, the firm’s capital 
structure, the source of financing, and tax effects. Although 
the average tender offer we observed created value, those 
financed with equity failed to do so. Those financed with asset 
sales, however, did create significant value. And although 
many firms stated their goal was debt reduction, we found 
that the average firm did not delever significantly.
face for the 11.75% notes and 112.5% of face for the 15.25% 
notes, while they offered to purchase the zero coupon bonds 
at 114.75% of accreted value. Healthtrust was also offering 
a $30/$1000 face consent payment for all bondholders who 
consented to the removal of all covenants. The offer prices 
were raised twice, and the tender offer and restructuring was 
completed in December of 1991.
Western Union: Western Union was under financial distress 
and missed an interest payment in June 1990. The company 
had not turned a profit since 1982 and was attempting to reduce 
the interest expense on over $500 million in junk rated debt 
carrying interest rates as high as 19.5%. Using $180 million 
from the sale of its telex and electronic mail businesses, the 
company repurchased debt with a face value of $335 million 
(i.e. a little over 50 cents on the dollar). This also required a 
consent solicitation to release covenants restricting the asset sale. 
Despite the repurchase, however, the company (renamed New 
Valley Corporation) was never able to service its remaining debt 
and filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in April 1993.
Table 9   Cross-Sectional Multivariate  
Analysis of Leverage Changes
Change in leverage from year -1 to year +1 (in book value terms) is the 
dependent variable.  MERGER takes on the value of 1 when the firm is involved 
in a takeover/merger and 0 otherwise. TAXLOSS takes on the value of 1 when 
the firm has tax loss carry-forwards in either year +1 or +2 and 0 otherwise. 
IPO takes on the value of 1 when the firm is going public and 0 otherwise. *, **, 
and *** indicate significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
Variable Point estimate t-value
Intercept 0.0501 1.89*
MERGER 0.1405 2.71***
TAXLOSS -0.1198 -2.57**
IPO -0.1335 -1.81*
R2 0.0967
Adjusted R2 0.0809 6.10*** (F-value)
N 175
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